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The Math and Terms of Angel/Venture Finance: How it Actually Works, Sponsored by Nutter

Breakout Session II: The Math and Terms of Angel/Venture Finance: How it Actually Works, Sponsored by Nutter

Speaker:

Jeremy Halpern, Partner; Co-Chair Food and Beverage Group, Nutter

Transcript

Note: Transcripts are automatically generated and may contain inaccuracies and spelling errors.

Speaker 1 [00:18] This presentation is designed to be anywhere from 30 minutes to 3 hours. We're gonna do the best we can to jam it into like 30 minutes and make that work. Um. The other thing is that it's a lot of these concepts, if you're not familiar with them, they're new, they're weird. There's no reason anybody ought to know this stuff. And so the deck is designed to be available to you as a reference tool to go back and look at things. So don't feel like, oh, that went by fast. I'll never see it again. Nope, it's there for you. Yes, uh, the deck will be posted at some point. Um, so who's Nutter? We're a law firm based in Boston. We're about now about 160+ lawyers, uh, client bases all over the world. The food and beverage practice is a national practice. A lot of clients in California, New York, Massachusetts, Texas, Colorado, uh, a bunch of international, so all over the place. Uh, and we really do just about everything for folks other than regulatory work. So for those who are starting businesses, getting investment, making investment. Commercial work, co-packing, distribution, brokerage, sales, marketing agency, endorsement, trademark, all that stuff, we do at Soup and nuts. Uh, my background is a little unusual. I spent some time as an investment banker as well as as an entrepreneur and an angel investor in the space. So I come at the world of putting money into companies through someone who has asked other people for money, put my own money in, invested other people's money, helped companies ask for other people's money, etc. so. Pretty 360. So what are we doing? Um, the first place that things go wrong in the world of corporate finance for small businesses is that everybody analogizes to what they know, right? It's the end of one problem, and the first thing you know is, well, when I buy shares on Microsoft, this is what happens. That's what happens when you buy stuff on Microsoft. Uh, does anyone know, does Microsoft know that you've bought a share or sold a share? The answer is no. In fact, they will never know, and they will never ever know if you and the seller were both using Fidelity. It's a book entry as far as Fidelity is concerned. No money flows over to Microsoft. Nothing happened to Microsoft at all. They don't care. That's not the world we live in. We live in a world where this happens. There's some stockholders who exist before a deal. And then there's a new stockholder who's added to the mix after the deal. So in our example, ABC exists, co-founders, the new investor. So the result of that is that now A, B, and C still have the same shares they had. But now D exists. So A, B, and C's percentage of what they had has gone down. Did AB and C get money? The answer is no, in case you're wondering, no. Sometimes by the time of, of a B round and certainly by a C round of investments, of a company that's doing $20.30 dollars, $40 100 million dollars, there's opportunities for the founders to get money personally. But in the early stage, money, all money is flowing to the company, all equity is flowing to the new investor. Nothing happens to the old shareholders. You don't dig in your pocket, find shares and go give them out to new investor. Nope, new, new stuff is created. So what does that mean? And uh, like in the most simplistic world, if you agreed on a value, and we can talk endlessly about how you get to a value. And then you divided that value by the number of units or shares that you have outstanding, and it doesn't matter what that number is, the math all works the same way. You get to some price per share, the investor buys in at that rate. In our example, $1 a share, they get some shares and now they own a piece of the whole. Right? So in our story, dollars a share, someone puts in $100,000 not surprisingly, they get 100,000 shares. There's now 100,000 new shares that didn't exist before. So now you've got, you've got 9 out of 10, they've got 1 out of 10. Right? It's not, not that complicated. It looks like that on a cap table. But that doesn't really tell you how the world works. That tells you the most simplistic version of how the world works. What happens, oh, and by the way, how do you get to the value? You get it on a negotiated basis. The first thing that happens in a deal is that. There's a conversation that's happening between investor and entrepreneur. What's the company worth, blah, blah, blah. We do that for a while and we don't get to specifics. And so if somebody says, oh, I have a deal with an investor, they're gonna put a million dollars into my company at a $3 million valuation. In our, in our old slide, the math would say that investor's got 25%. The Company was worth $3 million. We're gonna add a million dollars. Now it's worth $4 million. The investor has 1 out of 4, the founders have 3 out of 4, right? Do we all agree with that? Sure we do, but it's not true because what we don't spend time talking about is how do we do the math and what's happening. And one of the things that happens is the investor starts putting in a bunch of other terms. There's an old joke in early stage investing, if you wanna pick the value as the entrepreneur, OK, but I, the investor, get to pick the rest of the terms. Do you think that's a good deal for you? No, it's like an extended warranty. There's a reason they keep pushing them to you. Please take this thing. It's not because they don't make money on it, right? Same idea. If the investor wants to pick all the terms just because you've won the fight on the valuation, you've actually lost the war. Because the first thing that happens is they say things like, hey, we're gonna put an option plan in this deal. We're gonna create a bunch of fictional humans and fictional shares that are going to be treated as if they existed immediately before the deal happened. So in our example here, right, the option pool is 9% of the posts. Who did that 9% come from? You, you, you, you. Did it come out of the investor? No, no, no. Anything that gets added to the capitalization before the deal is coming exclusively out of you, the founder. Period. So what does that look like? So, this is the same deal we had before. They're putting $100,000 in at a $900,000 valuation. They not surprisingly still own 10%, but you surprisingly just went from 90% to 81%. Ta da. How, how excited are any of you about that? Not very excited. If the deal had been done, if the option plan had been done post-deal, they would have shared the dilution. They would have taken 10% of the dilution, but they didn't. They pushed it all on to you. So, you know, you start off here, you own everything. Suddenly there's an employee plan, and suddenly there's, you know, some other thing we'll talk about this in a second. Um, this is a bunch of text, so, it's a wall of words. Don't try and read this while I'm talking. It's no point. It's there for you to be in the presentation, but what it, what it's gonna tell you is that. The economics of a deal are baked into these complex documents, and they run a bunch of different ways and one of the most important things is investors are typically buying preferred stock and in preferred stock that usually means they get the better of one of two things. They either get their proportion of the company when it's sold, so if they, in our example, bought 10%, they would get 10% or they get their money back. But it turns out that the world still isn't that simple. See this here? Participating preferred participating preferred as they get their money back and they get their percentage. So let's imagine one of the companies is presenting on stage. You've raised $50 million. The investors own 60% of the company. They get in our perfect world, they get the better of $60 million. Or, uh, excuse me, 60% of the proceeds or $50 million. But what if it's participating? Well, now they get the 1st $50 million back and then 60% of what's left. Right? So let's say the company had been worth $100 million. They take $50 they get 60% of 50, that's another 30%. They got $80 million you've got $20 million and you means you and the entire team. Right? And when you actually do the math, if you had co-founders that went from life-changing, I never work again money to crap, I have a nice new car, but I'm still working money. It's not fun. The other thing is that deals happen where again, you, you want that valuation, you say, hey, I'm worth 10 million, and the investor goes, OK, OK. But instead of getting 1 times my money back or my percentage, I'm gonna get 2 times my money back or my percentage, a multiple of liquidation preference. Now, in that same deal, they get the 1st 100 million back. Plus, plus another 60% of what's left. Does this sound awesome to you? So when you read, one of the problems we have, and I, I'm, I love my friends here at Bevnet and at the press generally, but one of the problems we have is information bias. You read a lot in the press about either companies going bust or companies getting sold for a billion dollars. You occasionally read about companies getting sold for $100 million but you have no details and you immediately think, those founders sitting on the beach, drinking mai tais. Turns out I have worked on. Even in the last 3 years, I've worked on no less than 10 deals that were sold for about that kind of money, where the founders got 0. 000. Why? Because those, they had taken in so much money that accumulated all those liquidation preferences. They'd taken in a bunch of debt, and all of that led to a situation in which the investors might have made some money, particularly the later ones, maybe not the early ones, and the entrepreneurs made nothing. So making sure that you understand these documents and the complexity of the math is really important. By the way, I get paid by the hour. We make big documents. Big documents, 11 inch of documents, right? When I work on a, a financing documents, there's 1 inch of paper created. The difference between participating and non-participating, one sentence. In an inch of documentation. That's it. So think to yourself, the first practice note is when you're having a conversation with an investor, don't just focus on valuation. What is the liquidation preference? Is there an accruing dividend that is acting like a multiple liquidation preference? Is there an actual multiple on liquidation preference? People, you'll hear people say 2x, 3X. Is it participating? Are there management fees? The private equity folks love to take management fees where hundreds of thousands of dollars a year are flowing out to the investors as an additional return mechanism. Right? Is there an option plan? Is it coming out pre or post? All this stuff is happening. All right, so I'm gonna skip through all this. It's there for your reading. Um, about 15 years ago, some VC investor somewhere said, hey, I have this deal I wanna do. We're gonna put 10 million bucks into a thing, but they're running out of cash, so I'm gonna hand them this pretty simple piece of paper. And it will convert into the round when we finish doing our diligence and finish doing the documentation. That was called a convertible note. And some genius thought, what a great thing we can skip that inch of paperwork and dealing with Jeremy and the lawyers. Yay. What a great thing. We can avoid valuation. How many of you have heard the phrase kick the can down the road? Yeah, we're gonna kick the can, the valuation can down the road. And they came up with these mechanisms. And that mechanism worked when the investor was the, was both the bridge and the investor, right? They were, here's some, here's some money, quick and dirty. 90 days later, we're gonna close the round. Great, huzzah. But what happened was, is people took this thing and they started to use it for what it was never intended, which was to be a replacement for equity deals. So in an equity deal, you know the percentage at closing. I'm going to relay a conversation I have no less than once a quarter. Client calls up, we want to do a convertible note. Great. The investor wants to know how much of the company they're buying. What do I say? I don't know. It's a derivative. It changes over time. It is not a fixed percentage, even at the moment of closing. It's some number to be determined later. I have no idea. And they go, right, I understand. And then they call me back a day later. I talked to the investor and they understand that, but they want to know what percentage of the company they own. da da da da da da da and on we go. So, it's true. In priced equity, you have to agree on evaluation, you have to agree on terms. There's control rights, there's preemptive rights, there's all this stuff. They often get some anti-dilution protection in case you then go and issue more stock at a lower price. They get an adjustment for that, not all the way down to the new price, but an adjustment. Weighted average anti-dilution means we look at what's the difference between their price and the new price. And how many shares were issued at the new price. So if you went out and you issued. a billion shares at 1 penny cheaper, not much is going to happen. If you issue 1 share, 1 new share at 1 cent, not much is gonna happen. But if you issue a lot of shares at a much cheaper price, they're going to get a big adjustment. Full ratchet is where you adjust to the price. So if you sold one share at a penny, all of their investment gets repriced as if it cost them a penny. How much of the company do they own in that story? All of it. You have like 0.002% left. Don't do that, um. Once they've invested, how do you think they, they think? What's in their brain about the next investment? What do they want? So they're your, uh, we're gonna call them your seed round investor. What do they want out of the A-round investor? Anyone? Highest price possible because they want the least dilution to their own shares. OK, now let's talk about that magical convertible note. Instead of agreeing on a valuation, I'm gonna loan the company money, I, the investor. We're going to agree that I get some amount of equity in payment of that based on a bunch of things. OK. And I usually get interest and I get a discount on the next round. So in theory, by not pricing the investment at the time of the note, I get to build value. But again, life is not so simple because what happened next is not just these things, interest and a payment at maturity or a conversion at maturity. No, what happened next was someone went, you know, I don't like this because I, that entrepreneur is sneaky, and what they did was they found a friend of theirs to go put in $2 at a billion dollars valuation to try and convert my note at some absurd price. So I'm gonna now impose a cap, the highest price I will pay at conversion no matter what. Well, what have we just done then? What did we think we were skipping, but now we're actually doing? We're setting a valuation. We're setting a top. And people say, well, OK, then it's only fair that we get to set a floor. Uh, hey, Brad and Greg, how many times does that work out for you? 0 times, 0 times do you get to negotiate a floor where you say like, cool, the highest price you'll pay on the deal is X, and so the lowest price that you're gonna pay is Y. One deal out of 100 gets that and it's always some weird, unique situation, right? Not, I just called, you know, VMG and we're negotiating kind of an arm's length deal. No, no floor. And there's a discount. So here's what you need to know. Because of the discount and because of the cap, here are rules to live by. Never, ever, ever, ever, ever, ever do a convertible note. If an investor is willing to buy in at the price of the cap. And I'm gonna take you through the math just because it's worth imprinting that in your brain. If the cap is $4 million. That's the highest price the investor would pay. And the investor is also willing to invest at $4 million and they got a 20% discount. Number one, what needs to happen for them to invest at $4 million on that note, when that note flips, what needs to happen? Who can do math. You gotta go raise a round of at least $5 million because they're getting a discount, that 20%. So unless I raise the next round at more than $5 million they're not even paying the $4 million cap. If I raise a round at $4 million They're paying What's 80% of 4 million, 3.2 million? Right? They're not paying 4 million. Second, you've got interest, and I've seen notes. I'm working on a note right now. We just did one yesterday. Three-year note. We're doing another one right now, five-year note. Imagine the amount of interest that racks up. That's all eating into the value, all eating into the value. So if you can get that investor to buy in at 4 million versus a note at 4 million, do the equity. Because what's, what's more likely to happen? If I looked at all deals, Brad, what's more likely to happen? It's gonna be lower than $4 million. You say, let me show you my hockey stick in the presentation. We're gonna go from $0 today to $2 million in year 1 to $7 million in year two. We're gonna raise money at a $30 million run rate based on Crave selling to Hershey, and huzzah, it'll be golden. But what actually happens about 80% of the time is you perform under plan. And that next round you go to do, you end up with an investor saying, well, we'll give you a $3 million valuation. What does note investor get on a $3 million valuation? 2.4. Plus interest. Right? Had you done equity, they would have invested at 4 million, no interest, no adjustment. Because a convertible note acts as a full ratchet adjustment. Whatever the price is of the next investment, it goes all the way down. We said, you don't want to do full ratchets. And even worse, the worst of all things. So you do the convertible note, investor, we're gonna call investor John for sake of argument. Right? Investor is on your board. What is investor's motivation now? We said before, if they invest in equity, you said they want the next round to be. The highest possible. If I have a convertible note that I'm sitting on, and I'm on your board, what do I want the next round to be at? The lowest valuation. That's the person on your board. That's not good. You have massive disalignment. And you will start having conversations that sound really weird to you. Well, you know, we ought to just take the equity deal now and, you know, close out the cap table, make it rational and just move on from there. You're like, but, but it's so low. And they go, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, but it'll, it'll be fine. It'll be fine for them because they just invested at 2.4 million for a deal they would have invested at, at 4 million. Good for them, not so good for you. So you also got to make sure that at maturity, you have automatic conversion, because if you don't, you have somebody holding a gun to your head. Hi, I gave you a million dollars in a convertible note. You owe me a million dollars plus interest. Please pay. You go, but I can't pay. That's why we're raising money. I can't pay. And they say, OK, well, I'll convert it, but I want a valuation of $2 million. Or I can put you into insolvency and eat the whole asset. Or, or you can outbid me in bankruptcy. Good luck with that. Now, that doesn't happen very often, but it does happen. It is absolutely that it happens that if they don't have some mechanism for conversion at maturity, they've got way too much leverage. Right? So you got to figure out what do you do? What do you do with sale if the note's out there? Is there a sale premium? I'm doing a deal right now. The note holders have a 2x sale premium. So in a deal that's going for $8 million the note holders are getting about. The 1st 3.5 million bucks. Right? Way outsized because they had a 2x liquidity premium. All right, so what's good about notes? Well, they're cheaper to document. They're fast, high velocity, they used to call it. But investors are buying an unknown percentage. It doesn't in theory require you to agree on a valuation. Right? But you might need to agree on caps and discounts and what's the valuation at maturity and all this other stuff. So you're really back to negotiating value. Usually note holders have limited control rights, so they're not, they're often not on your board. They're often don't have a bunch of blocking rights for what you do. That part's good. But again, in full, it's the equivalent of full ratchet, which is not so good. And the biggest issue, disalignment, disalignment with your key investors. I hate that. All right, so You know, again, just the flip side, more expensive, fixed price, you know what's happening, all that good stuff. Um, so this is a cap table. I don't know if you can see it. I apologize for kind of the size of it, but just so you can see how it works, this is a deal in which there were some pre-existing note holders. Right? And there were some plan shares where the negotiated deal was, where it's gonna be 10% post-deal. And so this investor, right, when you look at the founders right before the deal, they basically had most of the company, and at the end of the deal, they they have less than a majority. They've lost control on a very simple deal. Of a million dollars in new money, $500,000 in old money, and an option plan, and boom, they've lost control. How often do we see this, Brad? Way too much. Because what they did was they moved all the dilution from the notes onto your side of the ledger. Same thing they did with the option plan. They said, when I said 3 million, that was 3 million for everything that's out there. That's for you, that's for the option holders, and that's for those notes that you raised so casually on a cocktail napkin over dinner. It's all on your side. So I said 3 million. I wasn't giving you 3 million for your portion of the equity. I was giving you $3 million for the whole enchilada. OK. So what are the concepts you're left with? You got to really know when you're doing this stuff. You got to get good help, good advisors, good lawyers, good accountants. Greg Wave back there, Ann, right? Great accounting firm. Have good mentors who can also help walk you through. Uh, the deals I like best are where there's an entrepreneur and they have a mentor who's involved in the conversation, and they're only interested in helping that person. They're not racking up fees. They just want to be a support source. That's a great thing to have. You got to know that the devil is in the details. This stuff is complicated. It all boils down to math. And if you feel like Excel spreadsheets are scary, that's not good. You gotta like get acculturated to it and be willing to dig in and have these hard conversations, right? So that's a big takeaway. Another big takeaway is that On the upside, you can make any problem in a corporate finance deal go away by imagining an outcome that's so big that nobody cares. When we sell for a billion dollars, who cares if I've got 10%? I would care, but maybe you don't care. I don't know, right? But that's not a good way to plan. The way to plan is to think about what is the mid-case scenario, what is the most likely thing to happen, and you might say, I think we're gonna be on the right side of the spectrum. We're gonna be at the outsized case, but I wanna plan like we're gonna be in the middle. So what do you do? What do you do if an investor won't give you that higher valuation? They're only giving you bad terms. What do you do? Thoughts? Do you curl up and cry? By the way, we did that. That was totally a strategy. Do you go talk to another investor? 100% of the time, you should never ever only talk to one investor. You are getting a bad picture of what you're worth and what the concerns are. And every time you talk to an investor, you get better educated about your own company. Right. We raised, uh, this is no joke, and my, my company that we were, uh, raising money for, we raised money on version 42 of the deck. 42. That Dick did not only get presented to one person in each iteration, I can assure you. All right, so talk to other people, but what else can you do? What else can you do if you can't get the terms you want? Nothing, crying, not a strategy. Hope not a strategy. OK, so what kind of working capital can you guys all go get, especially right now? So you can take out home equity, but SBA loans, huge source of capital. For anybody who checks any form of box for any organization, governmental or non-governmental. If they are looking for blue-eyed left-handed people who do jumping jacks and are willing to give you money, go like, I think I'm on the wrong foot. Yep, absolutely. That's me. Uh, the SBA has loans. They have, uh, additional loan programs for women, minority, disabled veteran owned businesses. There are startup programs at local banks. There are accelerators around the country who will put in at least small amounts of money to help you. What else? What else can you do? Grants, big one. Harder sometimes as a for-profit, but not always impossible. What else? All right, so let me, let me back up. The most important thing you can do if you're not getting investor traction is go execute. Go prove some of the data points. When you present your plan, it's just a thesis. Here's 150 unproven hypotheses about what I know now and what I think will be true later. None of it is actually true. It's all a guess. Right? And so you need to go execute. You need to go prove the points. What is my cost structure gonna look like? What is my uptake rate? What is my churn rate? What's my velocity per point of distribution per channel, right? I don't know any of this stuff. I have a good guess. I'm an educated guesser, but I don't really know. So go prove some data points. How do you do that if you don't have cash? What are ways you can stretch? What's that? Such as partnerships. OK, so sometimes you can find a friend and you can share some resources, right? So instead of spending $50,000 on a, on a, on a human, you can each spend $250,000 on the same human and fractionalize the time you're getting out of them. That can be very effective. You can get credit out of your vendors. Right? During COVID, we didn't bill people in some cases for over a year. Over a year, we just said We're taking a bet on you as your partner. Right? When you talk to ingredient suppliers, get credit terms. When you talk to commands, get credit terms. The single best thing you can do to accelerate your company. So go execute is the best way because as you have proof points, you get to have a really different conversation with the investor. We're this valuation because here's how we stack up against the competitor. Here's our spins and our IRI data. Here's our margin. Here's our velocity numbers. Here's our uptake numbers. Here's what people have said. We've done customer development work, which is cheaper than you think. How can you get 1000 points of feedback without paying $100,000? Anyone? You know this answer. You've seen it in real time. So you can use things like Constant Contact, MailChimp, those kind of things. You can do social media campaigns for relatively cheap. You know what else you can do? Doesn't sound sexy. You can stand in front of Trader Joe's like everybody else. Hi, can I get a moment of your time? Right? And you can go develop quite a lot of information from relatively cheap means that all are used to prove the point to the investor. So that's one thing. Now let's get to a really complicated way to do it. What if you flip the whole conversation over? And you said, instead of you betting on me, I'm gonna bet on me. What might that look like? So the famous case of this, how many of you have read Mission in a Bottle? One taker. OK. All of you go read Mission in a Bottle. It is a graphic novel format. I warn you in advance. It is the story of Seth Goldman and Barry Nailbuff who founded Honest Tea. And what they did. And one of the famous things that was true of them is they took some big bets on them. They took those lower valuations, but in exchange, what they said was, hey, you know what we're going to do? We're going to give ourselves a whole bunch of options that are way out of the money. And we're going to show you, investor. If we're right, we're going to end up owning more of the company than we do right now and more than you want us to. But in that case, you don't care because you've already made a lot of return. If we are wrong, it's all out of our hide. We are willing to throw the dice. How is that different from the equity conversation in the first place? What's the difference? There's no, you get nothing back. If you just agree on a low value, and you're diluted way down, if you're one of these companies that's taken $100 million of capital and you own 10%, you are never, you're getting tiny, tiny little fractions in option grants on a year to year basis. That's it. You're never getting back up to 40%, 50% ever, ever, ever. So if you want to do that, you can, you can really take some big risks, but it takes, again, it takes some understanding of how this works and an investor who's willing to listen to a pretty rational argument. All right, let me pause for a second. I've like all exploded your brains. You're all like, Jesus, why am I in this game in the first place? This is terrible. Questions? Yeah.

Speaker 2 [29:22] Let me pass the mic to you actually jump in. It's getting recorded, so you wanna have a good

Speaker 3 [29:32] Um, I was wondering if a consultant is looking to help you or your brand, um, say they can help you invest if you give them advisory shares at the end of like a, a closed investment. Is that something that you would recommend or, or would that be a red flag for you? Well,

Speaker 1 [29:48] you might have just meant about three different things, so one of them is fine and two of them are not so fine, um. The idea of working with any advisor who's getting, there's no magic to advisory shares. This is like founder shares. People think that's a thing. It's not a thing. You're just getting shares, um, and usually in the form of options. Um, so giving people options as an incentive to have them work with you when you can't pay them their market cash rate makes a ton of sense, ties them to the success of the company. Great thing to do. Anytime you give anybody equity, ever, whether it's an actual stock or a derivative like a convertible note or an option, you are subject to securities laws. And you're subject to two big regimes. One is the SEC you all know about. The other is FINRA, which governs the use of broker dealers. If what you meant is, I'm gonna help you raise money, but I'm not a registered broker dealer and you're gonna give me advisory shares, that's compensation in connection with a securities transaction that is regulated by FINRA. You have blown multiple regulations when you do that. Try not to. People do it all the time. It creates endless havoc at the far end, particularly if you're gonna get bought out by somebody in a stock for stock deal. That's, that's like the kiss of death if you've got that problem. Um, but it creates problems every time you go to raise money because you have a disclosure obligation. That investor's gonna say, have you complied with securities laws? You're gonna call your lawyer and go like, well, here's what we did. Your lawyer's gonna go, uh, uh, you're gonna go, crap. Now I've got to disclose that I have not. Complied with securities laws and that investor may get squirrelly. And why do they get squirrely? Because it makes the entire transaction that that was tied to subject to rescission. Any of the investors who took shares from that, you know, in connection with that uncompensated, excuse me, with that compensated individual can wake up one day and go, I, I want my money back. So that's a huge threat to the next investor who says, I don't want to put my money in, just have some early investor show up and go, rescind, rescind, give me my money back. So that's bad. Don't do that. Try and only work with registered broker dealers. If you don't have a registered broker dealer, There is not a thing called the finder exception, although people think there is, uh, there is some gray area that people operate in. There's some rules of the road. Never compensate people as a function of the deal price. Never have that person negotiate value for you. Never have that person act like a broker dealer and allege that they're a broker dealer, and at least stay as far away from the very bad things happening as possible, which is also getting investigatory action from, uh, one of the regulators.

Speaker 4 [32:20] Hi Jeremy, my name's Dean. Um, I have a question that kind of came up here in a recent conversation with a potential investor, and it was related to, um, because we have a social mission in our business that we need to either have some documents that clearly state what that mission is from an investment standpoint, so we're disclosing it and or set ourselves up as a B corporation. Do you have any thoughts on this? Does this cloud a deal? Is it?

Speaker 1 [32:49] So both of the things you said are actually wrong, and I'm gonna, I'm gonna correct you, but you're, but you're close, and that's the problem is they sound right. They sound logical, but, I don't know what I don't know. Well, and that's why I'm asking how I live most of my days and even the things I know, my wife tells me no, um, the, uh, so the thing you meant is a benefit corp, not a B Corp. A B Corp is a third party certification from a place called B Lab. Uh, a benefit corp is a state vehicle like being a partnership or a corporation or an LLC. There's another category called benefit corporation. Um, each state has its own rules of the road. In most states, you can have the social mission enshrined into your documentation so that when you go to the investor and say we are not required to only act in the interest of shareholder value, we are also permitted. To. Think about the environment, think about the local population, think about the labor force, whatever it is. We're allowed to do that and you can't sue us for not just driving the profit machine. It turns out in Delaware, you can't do that. You have to actually be a benefit corp because Delaware law is kind of very like, it's all about the shareholders. If you don't want that, you gotta go be a benefit corp. Um, most investors today are perfectly fine with investing into double bottom line companies, meaning companies that have a social impact goal and they have a profit motive. If they can get an understanding of why are we doing this thing, what are the bounds of that social mission? Is it, are we gonna be a nonprofit in, in actuality? Are we gonna always make sure that we have no profit? That's bad. We don't like that story. Or is it that, uh, I'm working on one now where they're gonna give 10% of profits to charity. Will that affect investability? It will, no question about it. Had he said 2%, probably not. 10%, people are gonna go like, uh, so some investors who are impact investors will love that, and a bunch of investors will say, not for us. We only want people where 100% of the profit is staying in the company for reinvestment or being distributed out. So lots and lots and lots. If you looked at, uh, most of the major companies, uh, formed that are doing, you know, $50 to $100 million in revenue, a good chunk of them have some social mission either explicitly in their charter documents or as part of their marketing package, and it is disclosed to investors and they say, here are some of the things we're gonna do, right? And you need to be comfortable with that before you sign. We don't wanna hear complaining later about it. Does that fully answer your question?

Speaker 4 [35:21] Question to what you just said, is there any benefit. like

Speaker 1 [35:26] Hybrid. Yeah, this is the hybrid. So I'm doing one of these right now. So a hybrid is where you have a 50, you know, a tax-exempt vehicle side by side with a for-profit vehicle. There are cases that makes sense most of the time for a high-growth business that's going to seek venture capital. It doesn't. You're better off building the for-profit business for quite some time and then having a nonprofit established on site because the compliance cost and the legal cost of setting it all up and maintaining it is expensive relative to low dollar companies. You have to be very careful that the items of revenue and items of expense are landing in the right bucket, and you have to be very careful that. Uh, shared resources are being charged back to the appropriate party. So you can't have the for-profit absorb all the expenses and the nonprofit absorb all the revenue as a way to make all the taxes go bye-bye. They frown on that quite a lot. When you are a benefit corp, and certainly when you're a nonprofit, you become subject to the state attorney general oversight in most states. So always in the case of a 501, you're subject to the IRS and to the AG, but for benefit corps, you're often subject to the AG as well, which means they get to step in and say, you're not doing that thing you said you were doing. So some of the states have really frustrating benefit corp statutes where you've got to have an, uh, you know, a third-party independent benefit director who gets to weigh in and say, every action we're taking is, are we complying with this thing? If we're not, I can, I, the independent director can say no, and that's the end of the conversation. So. Just it depends every situation is a little bit different. That's, I wish I had a better answer, but, um, but being thoughtful about it, it's great. Last question.

Speaker 5 [37:05] Hey, Seth Gunther, um, so like 1015 years ago, you know, if you were a founder and you needed, you know, you needed money to go into retail properly. You really had no other choice, right? You had to just kind of pick your best investor or your best angel money that's gonna give you the, the best terms. Given everything that you've said and all the pitfalls and, and all of those different things, does it make more sense today for a founder to focus more on direct to consumer to, you know, I just heard a president. in the other room earlier where you know you had a lot of D2C brands who, who kind of built those brands D2C and use that money that they were making basically to then fund the retail, you know, the, the retail strategy. Do you have any opinion on that or, or

Speaker 1 [37:56] I do. It's uninformed, but yes, um, the. Uh, so the first thing is, uh, you asked, you know, should companies be in D2C generally, right? Is that a strategy to cash flow the other side of the business? Um, the answer is often yes. Uh, has some caveats. One, investors and acquirers devalue ECO revenue even though it's often higher margin revenue. And it's a revenue that also comes with data, which none of your retail revenue comes with, right? The best revenue like retail data you can get is from a retailer telling you some stuff about their general trends. You can't get consumer layered data unless you spend a lot of money with one of the very large marketing firms to say like, oh, we actually know that, you know, when I swiped my CVS card, that this guy bought this drink and that cheese, and isn't that interesting data, right? You can't get that as an early-stage brand. When you're D2C, you get lots of data. Now I know lots of things about that user, including potentially their email address. You get lots of ancillary benefits in being D2C. The downside is acquirers don't know what to do with D2C businesses. So most acquirers today. When they buy a business, if it's $50 million in D2C and $20 million in retail, they're gonna give you a higher multiple on the retail dollars than the D2C dollars because they don't know how to scale DTC. Not only do they not know how to scale it, most of them don't do it. If you looked at the top 20 major food companies, most of them, they, you have no ability to buy direct. The analogy is go, go buy a, uh, a Bosch, uh, dishwasher from Bosch. You can't. Well, that's how those companies were set up on the food side. You can only buy from retail or from a third-party platform. So they don't have the experience of building and managing their own e-commerce. They're starting to. It's one of the reasons they buy small brands is to get really good ecom people, right? It's like, swoop, would you please go run my other 17 brands now? Um, the second thing you asked is, you kind of implied it's really expensive to do retail. It is, no doubt. One of the reasons it's really expensive to do retail is because entrepreneurs get stars in their eyes and they want to talk to people about 1000 points of distribution. There's no, no, none, 0, not an upside to being widely spread. Before you're ready. And so the bigger problem is brands that decide to do across the country, a bunch of retailers, they're paying slotting, they're paying free-fill, they're the logistics cost, right? They're manufacturing in New Jersey and they're shipping product to California over the Rockies, which is the most expensive thing you can do in the food game. They're doing all of that and they're burning capital, right? So the answer is why get big? Because what investors care a lot more about is velocity per point of distribution. I care way more about dollars per linear inch per month than I care about that you're in a 1000 different retailers where you're not selling well. In fact, most definitely if you're not selling well, it's the opposite of being good for you. So you think of it as like, oh great, I got authorized and so and so. Unless that's profitable, and that's actually driving capital, don't do it. So the, uh, the reason I bring it up is the thesis is kind of wrong, which is, if you're everywhere and it's too expensive, do you go to Ecom? That's what a lot of brands end up doing. But if you're wise, you don't go wide before you get deep.

Speaker 5 [41:17] So, so I guess a corollary question would be, is there a way to. Build a brand as a founder where you're not taking in outside capital where you're doing D2C and you're just disciplined and focused on going very, very deep into one, you know, one area of retail within a state or within a, you know, whatever it is. But is that, is that a way to, um, kind of avoid, you know, the angel investment being diluted, all of that, and kind of, you know, coming out of that and, you know, where maybe you have higher revenues and, and, you know, you're an acquisition candidate.

Speaker 1 [41:57] So, um, yes, it's harder now than it ever was because there's so many, right? 15 years ago, there were half the number of people at a conference like this. There were many fewer innovation players that you were competing with. Now it's very, very competitive. There's almost no product or set that doesn't now have a legacy brand and 15 established, I'm better than the legacy brand products, right? So it's harder now. Um, I like you to see there are brands that have been built to $100 million purely on the back of DDC. No question. Um, you gotta be good at it. Most people aren't good at it. There are third party services that can help, but it's usually the combination of working with influencers, doing earned media, doing paid media, doing all of the social strategies. And really driving that that platform because again if you're creating volume without margin, you're just literally taking cash into the street and lighting it on fire, right? And you're wasting your time like your time is so valuable. So, you know, when I, when investors and acquirs look at businesses, they look at it longitudinally. Are you a $20 million business after 3 years? Wow, that's amazing. Are you a $20 million business after $20 million after 20 years? Not so amazing. Growth curve, not high. Right? So your time is incredibly valuable. So, Spending time on things for incremental dollars that aren't really driving reasonable like value creation and risk reduction moments isn't good. It's the hardest thing as an entrepreneur. You're like, oh, I see a dollar over there I can chase. Let me go chase that, and now let me go chase this one, right? But all of that takes time. So how do you, how do you prioritize that stuff? Um, some of the best brands are very focused on who their customers and their channel, and they don't care about trying to, uh, like please or reach every customer. Don't care. We'll get to them later. They're a later problem, not a now problem. Right? So focus is your friend. Focus allows you to be more efficient with every dollar that you spend. Every dollar that you spend that's focused is a $1 you didn't have to go raise. And I'm gonna, I'm gonna leave you with one last impression despite having good friends in the VC world. Uh, venture capital is a tool, not a goal. Put your right hand up. Go on. Put your right hand up. Go on, put it up. Venture capital is a tool, not a goal. Say it. Yeah, there are no points when you read in the paper, so and so raised $30 million and you're like, oh, I hate those guys. How come they got it? That's 30 million obligations they just took on. And as we talked about in the math, that might be $90 million of obligations they just took on. It's a tool, not a goal. It's a thing you do because you can't figure out a way to fund the deficit through organic means. Right? You can't cash flow it. You need big chunks of capital to go do very specific things. And so venture capital is a tool. It's a tool that allows you to do that, but it has very specific consequences that the growth you need to then be hitting for that to make economic sense for you, the founder. Otherwise, what you've done is basically sold your company in disguise. And that's frustrating. Am I out of time?

Speaker 2 [45:06] Kind of sort of, uh, thank you. My pleasure. We're going down to the after party or whatever we call it, but Jeremy, I hope we'll be there.

Speaker 1 [45:16] Absolutely. Drinks are on. Drinks are on BevNET. Yeah.

Speaker 2 [45:19] Questions are on you. Nice job.

Speaker 1 [45:21] Thanks everybody.

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